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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
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Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 930304-CA

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, JR.,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant,
JURISDICTION OP THE COURT
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Judge Lynn Davis, denying Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss and denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss following an
entrapment hearing and from final judgment of conviction and
sentence following conditional no-contest pleas to one (l) count of
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree
Felony, and one (1) count of Possession of a Listed Chemical with
Intent to Manufacture a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree
Felony, said judgment having been entered April 27, 1993. Section
78-2a-3 (2)(f), Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, confers
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear this appeal.
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the lower court commit reversible error by failing to
dismiss the State prosecution of the Appellant for the same conduct
1

which involved a federal prosecution terminated by a violation of
Appellant's right to a speedy trial?
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in denial of

Appellant's right to due process and speedy trial as guaranteed by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States?
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by not

granting Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure of the State to
produce a material witness?
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying the
Appellant's claim of entrapment?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS,
JR. , for one (1) count of Arranging to Distribute a Controlled
Substance, a Second Degree Felony, and one (1) count of Possession
of a Listed Chemical with Intent to Manufacture a Controlled
Substance, a Second Degree Felony,

Following

the denial of

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss for Entrapment after an evidentiary
hearing, and the denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss upon
denial of speedy trial rights, double jeopardy grounds, collateral
estoppel and due process, Appellant, pursuant to plea agreement and
State v, Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), entered a plea of no
contest to each of the counts stated above.

Appellant was

sentenced to serve two (2) concurrent sentences of 1-15 years in
the Utah State Prison.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 26, 1992, Appellant was arrested by law enforcement
officers and charged with three

(3) separate counts of drug

violations in Utah County, all having alleged to occur on August 7,
1991.

(See Exhibit "A")

Appellant was charged to have violated

§58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) , Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance,
Methamphetamine, a Second Degree Felony, and two (2) counts of
violating §58-37c-4, Possession of a Listed Chemical with Intent to
Manufacture a Controlled Substance, both Second Degree Felonies.
While incarcerated in Oregon waiting trial on charges which
were subsequently dismissed, Appellant became acquainted with a
prisoner named Ross Argyle.

Mr. Argyle was being held for

extradition to the State of Utah for a probation violation. Argyle
and Appellant

exchanged

addresses

and

telephone

numbers, as

Appellant was interested in working in the construction business
upon his release and Argyle claimed to have contacts who could use
additional help.

Argyle was released and soon thereafter, the

charges against Appellant were dismissed and he was released.
(Addendum, Exhibit "B")

Upon his release, Appellant received a

telephone call from Argyle made to Appellant's parents7 home in
Reno, Nevada.

Argyle requested that Appellant come to Utah and

help manufacture methamphetamine.

Argyle called again later and

this time asked the Appellant to come to Utah and teach Argyle and
a person named "Kenny" how to manufacture methamphetamine. (Tape
trans. 8-31-91)

When Appellant was reluctant, Argyle said they

would pay him $10,000.00 for his assistance and provide him with
3

transportation from Reno, Nevada, to Wendover, Utah, where he would
be picked up and brought to another location in Utah.

Appellant

had no money and therefore agreed to come to Utah. (Hr. pp. 3 6)
Argyle was working with the Provo Police Department and made
the telephone calls to Appellant in return for money and to avoid
jail time for a probation violation.

The Provo police officers

involved other Utah County officers and a DEA agent in the plan.
The DEA agent, Illsley, picked Appellant up, purchased beer for him
and transported him to Utah County where the officers had a motor
home set up as a clandestine lab.

The materials, facility, and

equipment was all provided by the officers.

Upon arrival at the

site, Appellant was shown $10,000.00 in cash to induce him to
follow through.

Appellant was arrested before any controlled

substance was manufactured. (Hr. pp. 83-84)
On August 15, 1991, Appellant was indicted by a grand jury in
the United States District Court, Central Division, District of
Utah, case number 91-CR-193G, in an Indictment alleging violations
of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(l) and §846 which prohibit the intentional
manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, and
the attempt or conspiracy to do commit the offense. Appellant was
incarcerated in pretrial confinement awaiting trial in federal
court.

After several delays, Appellant moved to dismiss the

federal Indictment upon the grounds of a denial of speedy trial.
United States District Judge Thomas Greene granted Appellant's
motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial on August 25, 1992, and
4

dismissed the Indictment with prejudice.

On August 26, 1992, the

Appellant was released from the jail in which he had been held
pending trial, but was immediately arrested on a warrant for the
charges in the present case.

Bail was set in the amount of

$10,000.00, but the Appellant was unable to afford a bail bond.
After being unsuccessful in obtaining a pretrial release in the
state system pending trial due to his impecuniosity, the Appellant
filed a motion to reduce bail. Said motion was denied by the trial
court and Appellant remained incarcerated throughout the whole time
of his arrest on federal charges and through all of the state
proceedings.
Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of speedy trial,
the denial of due process; in that, jeopardy had attached in the
federal

prosecution

and

that the State

was prohibited

from

prosecution by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, raised the
issue of the prohibition against prosecution under §§76-1-404 and
76-1-403 and raised the defense of entrapment.

Prior to the

evidentiary hearing on the issue of entrapment, the Appellant filed
a Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-of-state Witness, stating the
Appellant's claim that the informant Argyle was material to his
defense of entrapment. At the evidentiary hearing on December 10,
1992, the State did not call or produce the informant Argyle.
After discussion of the Appellant's request and motion, the Court
ordered the State to produce the witness Argyle. The remainder of
the hearing was continued until March 8, 1993, to allow the State
sufficient time to locate Argyle.
5

(Hr, pp. 8, 98-99)

The State

indicated they could not locate Argyle at the time of the hearing
on March 8, 1993. Appellant's counsel moved the Court for an order
dismissing the matter as a result of the failure of the State to
produce a witness material to Appellant's defense.
witnesses were called.

No further

The court, after receiving several written

memorandums and holding the partial evidentiary hearing on the
issue of entrapment, ruled against the Appellant on all issues
which had been raised by motion.

(Addendum, Exhibit "C")

Appellant then entered into a plea agreement with the State in
which Appellant agreed to enter pleas of no contest to two (2) of
the counts of the Information pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) to preserve his right to appeal the
rulings on his Motions to Dismiss and the Court's denial of the
entrapment defense.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The

lower

court

committed

reversible

error

in

denying

Appellant's Motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial under the
federal and state constitutional guarantees of speedy trial, since
the State was fully aware that the Appellant was held on the acts
constituting the state charges. The law enforcement team in charge
of the investigation consisted of agents from DEA as well as local
Utah County officers.
The trial court committed reversible error by its denial of
Appellant's claims of double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and
denial of due process in violation of the constitutional guarantees
6

of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the State of Utah.

Where the prosecution team with the exception

of the attorney prosecuting the case is the same as that involved
in the federal prosecution, and the evidence, criminal episode, and
witnesses are the same in both prosecutions, Appellant's right
against double jeopardy should protect him from the subsequent
state

prosecution.

In

the

alternative,

the

principles

of

collateral estoppel should prohibit the State from proceeding after
the federal prosecution has been terminated upon a denial of speedy
trial.
The trial court committed reversible error by denying the
Appellant's claim of entrapment. The trial court should have found
that the Appellant was entrapped as a matter of law where the
Appellant had no means, intent or prior involvement in the State of
Utah and where the criminal plan was created solely by the officers
without any prior participation on the part of the Appellant.
The Appellant's rights to due process of law and compulsory
process under the provisions of the Utah State Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States was violated by the failure of
the State to produce an informant who played a vital role and who
was material to the defense of the Appellant.

The court did not

make any finding that the State had made reasonable efforts to
locate the witness and erred in determining that the witness was
not material.

7

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE
STATE PROSECUTION OF THE APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF THE COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
A.

The Standard of Review.

The standard of review in regard to this issue is that of a
review for correctness.
B.

The trial court committed reversible error by failing to

dismiss the state prosecution of the Appellant where the federal
court had determined that he had been denied right to speedy trial
on charges involving the same conduct.
Appellant asserts that the procedural due process guaranteed
him

by

the

federal

constitution

has

been

violated

by

the

institution of this prosecution following the dismissal of the
federal case upon speedy trial grounds.

The collateral estoppel

doctrine of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution applies
in this case.

In U.S. v. Belcher, 762 F.Supp 666 (W.D. Va. 1991),

the court considered a case where the defendant had been convicted
in a state prosecution and then obtained a reversal on appeal, at
which

time

he was

federally

prosecuted

for

the

same acts.

Recognizing the general principle of "dual sovereignty" to allow
independent federal and state prosecutions of defendants for the
same acts, the court also stated limitations on that general
doctrine.

The limitation set forth in the Belcher case is that

where the same individuals are involved in the prosecution (in that
case, the state prosecutor also functioned as a special assistant
8

federal prosecutor), the court found a lack of independent exercise
of power and held that the subsequent federal prosecution by the
same prosecutor of the same subject matter was merely a "sham and
a cover" for the failed state prosecution and that the doctrines of
collateral estoppel prohibited the subsequent prosecution.

762

F.Supp 666, at 671
It is Appellant's position that the federal and state entities
are so closely entwined in this case that the dual sovereignty
doctrine does not apply.

The fact that the state prosecutor

himself was not directly involved in the prosecution in the federal
case

is not

estoppel

a distinction

claim

enforcement
prosecution.

in

this

agencies

which would

case

were

since

directly

the

defeat

the

collateral

local

and

state

involved

in

the

law

federal

See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, which held that

the law enforcement officers and the prosecutor are a team and
information known to one is attributable to the other.

See also

Barbee v. Warden. 331 F2d 842, on this point.
Appellant submits that the Appellee, State of Utah, should not
be able to avoid the speedy trial claims of the Appellant by the
claim that their arrest of the Appellant was the triggering act for
speedy trial purposes.

Since the local officers were involved

directly in the federal arrest and prosecution, the time for speedy
trial purposes should run from that federal arrest and the decision
of Judge Greene dismissing the prosecution of the Appellant with
prejudice upon speedy trial grounds and should estop the State from
further prosecution.

Otherwise, any defendant charged federally
9

could be held as was the Appellant for a period of time, which
violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial, only to be
subject to state prosecution for the same offenses.
prosecution

The later

then becomes a tool or "sham" prosecution

of the

federal government to allow the defendant to be prosecuted despite
constitutional violations.

Such is the evil that the case law

cited above seeks to avoid.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE SPEEDY TRIAL CLAUSE OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WERE
VIOLATED BY THE DELAY IN FILING STATE CHARGES.
A.

The Standard of Review.

The standard of review in regard to this issue is that of a
review for correctness.
B.

The Appellant's due process rights guaranteed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
were violated by the delay in filing state charges.
In this case, as set forth in the facts above, the State's
triggering event which prompted the State of Utah to file the
charges

in the present case was the dismissal of the

federal

Indictment by the United States District Judge upon speedy trial
grounds.
within

The Appellant was arrested on charges in this matter

hours

of

being

released

from

federal

custody.

The

prosecution of the state case was not delayed by any additional
investigation which was necessary to identify additional suspects
or to gain additional evidence to establish the Appellant's guilt.
10

The State could have filed charges immediately upon the arrest of
the Appellant by the federal authorities, instead of delaying for
approximately one year while the Appellant remained in federal
custody.
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52
L.Ed. 2d 752

(1977) held

that where the delay

in

filing an

Indictment, the delay does not constitute a violation of due
process unless there is a showing that the prosecutor's delay
"violates those fundamental concepts of justice which lie at the
base of our civil and political institutions, and which define the
communities' sense of fair play and decency." 431 U.S. at 790. As
set forth in the argument in Point I above, this is not a case
where the federal and state authorities were working independently
of each other and were not aware of the efforts of the other.

To

the contrary/ this was a joint sting operation with the involvement
of both federal and state officers. Appellant submits that it is
fundamentally unfair and a demonstration of lack of fair play to
allow the Appellant to sit in jail for a year under the federal
Indictment and then, when the federal court provided constitutional
relief for that delay, to initiate a state prosecution for the
conduct arising from the same activity.
In State v. Smith. 699 P.2d 711, the court found that the
state's pre-accusation delay would not constitute reversible error
unless the defendant could show some prejudice as a result of the
delay.

in Smith, the defendant was in custody on a parole

violation during the delay following his arrest from October of
11

1981 until charges were filed in September of 1982.

The court

upheld the conviction in Smith since the Appellant did not show
that he had

been prejudiced

by pretrial

delay

or that the

prosecution had gained any tactical advantage as a result of the
delay.

(699 P.2d at 713) In the present case, in addition to the

Appellant's being held in federal custody for over one year, a
material witness became unavailable.

The confidential informant

Ross Argyle was unavailable at the time of the entrapment hearing
in this matter. As set forth in the facts above, Appellant sought
to secure his attendance for purposes of the trial and entrapment
hearing, but the State, after being ordered to produce Argyle,
could not locate him.
attempting

to

secure

As set forth in Appellant's Motion in
the

attendance

of

Argyle,

there

were

conversations between the Appellant and Argyle which the Appellant
claimed constituted entrapment and which were not taped. (A review
of the transcriptions of the telephone conversations between the
Appellant and Argyle introduced at the entrapment hearing clearly
demonstrates that there had been previous conversations between the
two prior to the taping)

Further, there was confusion among the

State's own witnesses as to the inducement which had been promised
to Argyle in order to obtain his cooperation. Also in question is
at what point he became a government agent.

At the time of the

hearing of the motion of the Appellant to secure Argyle as a
material witness, there was no dispute as to whether he was a
material witness.

(The trial court, in an effort to justify denial

of Appellant's motion to dismiss for the failure of the State to
12

comply with the order of the court to produce Argyle, later made a
finding that Argyle was not a material witness on the grounds that
the Appellant had

not shown that his testimony was material)

(Addendum, Exhibit "C" pp.14) See also United States v. Revada, 574
F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1978)
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant submits that the delay was
constitutionally unfair and a denial of his right to due process
and speedy trial pursuant to the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Speedy Trial
Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT GRANTING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PRODUCE
A MATERIAL WITNESS
A.

The Standard of Review.

The standard of review in regard to this issue is that of a
review for correctness.
B. The trial court committed reversible error by not granting
Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure of the State to produce
a material witness.
The Appellant filed a Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-ofState Witness to obtain the presence of Ross Argyle, the State's
informant and the person who first contacted the Appellant and
discussed his coming to Utah.

Appellant's Motion set forth the

grounds for his request that Argyle had made representations to the
Appellant which constituted entrapment, that Argyle was acting on
behalf

of

law

enforcement

agencies, that Argyle was
13

promised

substantial inducement which was conditional upon his successfully
inducing Appellant into participation of illegal activities, and
that without Argyle, the Appellant could not fully present his
entrapment defense. (Addendum, Exhibit "D")
Prior to the hearing on entrapment held by the court, the
Appellant's counsel, the prosecution, and the court discussed the
motion to secure the witness.

The State's only objection was not

that Argyle was not a material witness to the defense, but that the
State did not want to be required to pay the witness fees since the
Appellant, although indigent, was represented by private counsel.
The State's attorney indicated that rather than have the court
order the State to pay

for the Appellant to have the witness

appear, he would agree to have the witness present as the State's
witness

and

that

the

State

would

produce

him.

(Hr.

pp.5-6)

Appellant7 counsel responded that the Appellant was not concerned
with whether or not Argyle was a witness for the State or for the
Appellant, the Appellant's concern was to have him before the court
so that the full information concerning the transaction could be
explored.

The Appellant's counsel agreed to proceed with the

entrapment hearing with the witnesses which were present and to
then continue the hearing to the day prior to the trial on the
condition that Argyle would then be present. (Hr. pp. 7-9)

The

court indicated that the court was inclined to grant Appellant's
request, but found the suggestion of the State acceptable.

The

court, counsel for the State, and counsel for the Appellant then
agreed that an order would be entered
14

requiring the State to

produce Argyle. (Hr. pp. 9)
On the day set for the continuation of the entrapment hearing,
the State did not produce Argyle indicating they were unable to
locate him.

Appellant made a motion to dismiss based upon the

failure of the State to comply with the order of the court to
produce Argyle. The court took Appellant's motion under advisement
and then made a ruling denying said motion. (Addendum, Exhibit "C")
The grounds stated by the court for denying the motion to
dismiss were that Argyle had not been demonstrated to be a material
witness by the Appellant, therefore his Due Process and Sixth
Amendment

right

(Addendum,

to

Exhibit

Compulsory
"C" pp.

Process

13)

reasoning by the court is flawed.
materiality

of

the

witness

had

Appellant

not

been

argues

denied.

that

this

There was no issue as to the

Argyle

nor

any

challenge

to

the

assertions of the Appellant as to his importance to his entrapment
defense.

Neither the court nor the State questioned his status as

material to the Appellant.

The statute under which the motion to

secure was brought, Utah Code Ann. §77-21-3 is only applicable to
material witnesses.

The court as indicated above, had no question

at the time of the hearing on the motion as to whether or not the
witness was material and was inclined to grant the motion.

Had the

court or counsel for the State voiced such a concern at that time,
and the court entered a finding that Argyle was not a material
witness, the Appellant could have sought interlocutory relief. The
court and the State should be bound by the State's agreement to
take responsibility for the production of the witness.

15

The right of the criminal defendant to compulsory process is
well established.

The United States Supreme Court in Taylor v.

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 98 L.Ed 2d 798, stated that "few rights are
more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense." 484 U.S. at 410.

The Supreme Court in United

States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 41 L Ed 2d 1039 made the following
observation:
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of
our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere
more profoundly manifest than in our view that "the twofold
aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer." Beraer v. United States. 295 US, at 88, 79
L Ed 1314. We have elected to employ an adversary system of
criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues
before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts
in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive.
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments
were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of
the facts.
The very integrity of the judicial system and
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the
function of courts that compulsory process be available for
the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or
by the defense. 418 US at 708-709.
Appellant

contends

that

the

constitutional

provisions

of

Article I, Section 12, also provides the Appellant with the right
to compulsory process.

Interestingly, the trial court cited State

v. Schreuder, 712 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1985) as authority supporting the
court's denial of the Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to
produce.

Appellant

suggests that under the

reasoning

of the

appellate court in Schreuder, the trial court should have granted
the motion to dismiss.

The determination

of materiality

had

already been established at the time the court ordered the state to
produce Argyle.

If the trial court had not decided at that time
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that Argyle was a material witness subject to the provisions of
Utah Code Ann, §77-21-3, the court would have at that time simply
made that ruling and denied the motion. The court made no findings
or determination that the efforts of the State to locate the
witness were adequate.

There having been no evidence or claim of

immateriality presented to the court by the State, the court's
after-the-fact determination constitutes clear error and justifies
reversal.
POINT IV
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS UPON THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
A.

The Standard of Review.

The standard of review in regard to this issue is whether the
decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous.
B.

The trial court committed reversible error in denying

Appellant's Motion to dismiss upon the defense of entrapment.
Appellant filed a Motion to dismiss the criminal prosecution
in this matter upon the grounds that he was entrapped into the
commission of the offense.

The trial court held a hearing on the

issue of entrapment on December 10, 1992.

The Appellant filed a

Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-of-State Witness pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-21-3 to obtain the presence of
Ross Argyle, the informant who initially set up the contact with
the Appellant and introduced him to law enforcement officers.
pp.4-5,

13-15)

Appellant

set

forth

in the Motion

to

(Hr.

Secure

Attendance specific proffer as to the necessity of having the
witness appear.

The Motion clearly
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indicated that Argyle was

necessary for the Appellant to establish the defense of entrapment
since

Argyle

made

the

initial

contacts

with

the

Appellant.

(Addendum, Exhibit "D") The State took the position that they were
as interested

in having the witness Argyle present as was the

Appellant and proposed that the State be responsible to locate and
produce Argyle to testify at the continuation of the evidentiary
hearing on entrapment. (Hr. pp. 9)

The court then issued an order

which required the State to produce the witness Argyle at the time
of the continuation of the evidentiary hearing set for March 8,
1993. (Addendum, Exhibit "E")(Hg. pp. 9) Appellant agreed to allow
the State to proceed with the witnesses with the exception of
Argyle upon the condition and agreement between court and counsel
that the court would make no ruling until after the additional
witness had testified. (Hr. pp. 7-8)
The State called Provo City police officer Egan who testified
that Ross Argyle had approached law enforcement officers with the
intent

of

providing

information

concerning

those

involved

in

illicit drug distribution in return for financial consideration and
reduction of a jail sentence.

Officer Egan was unsure of the

amount of money involved or the specifics of the reduction of jail
time offered to Argyle as consideration for his involvement. (Hr.
pp. 16-17)

Provo City officer Parker was then called as the person

whom Argyle had first approached with the information.

At the time

Argyle approached Parker, he indicated that the Appellant was out
of the state of Utah.

(Hr. pp. 21)

Parker testified that the

agreement with Argyle was that he would receive a sum of money in
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the event he was successful in introducing a DEA agent to Appellant
and upon the introduction being "fruitful." Parker testified that
he did not know how much Argyle was offered or whether he was
offered consideration in the form of reduction of jail time. (Hr.
pp. 30-31)
Officer Parker also testified that at the time DEA agent
Illsley and Provo police contacted Appellant, Appellant was in the
state of Nevada, and did not have the money for a bus ticket to
come to Utah.

Further, he testified that all of the money to be

expended in connection with obtaining chemicals, equipment and the
site for the criminal activity was provided by the law enforcement
agents, including food and beer. (Hr. pp. 35-38)

Parker stated

that the joint law enforcement team offered Appellant $10,000.00 to
come

into

the

state

of

Utah

and

show

them

how

to

make

methamphetamine. (Hr. pp. 38)
The State represented by proffer that the State did not
participate in the reduction of any pending jail sentences facing
the informant Argyle, but that the State did agree to waive any
extradition costs associated with his cases.

Counsel for the

Appellant proffered that the court records showed in Case No. CR8816 there was a recommendation from the Division of Corrections
that Argyle serve nine (9) months for the probation violation, but
that the court did not sentence Argyle to any jail time as a result
of his probation violation. Counsel also indicated that it was his
understanding that Argyle had also been sentenced to serve 120 days
on a city case which was not served. (Hr. pp. 43-46)
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Charles Illsley, the DEA agent involved, testified that he was
aware that in addition to $2,000.00 cash payment by the DEA, that
the Provo City officers were going to contact authorities to gain
consideration for Argyle in regard to pending jail time. (Hr. pp.
87-88)

He further testified that Argyle would not be paid any of

the $2,000.00 unless he was successful in convincing the Appellant
to come to Utah and set up the clandestine laboratory. (Hr. pp. 8990)
Illsley also testified that his agency had no prior interest
or information concerning the involvement of Appellant in illicit
drug activities prior to being contacted by Provo City officers.
(Hr. pp. 75)

He testified that he was aware that the Appellant did

not even have the money to travel to Utah and that part of the
arrangement was that the law enforcement team wired Appellant the
money to purchase a bus ticket to Wendover, Utah, where agent
Illsley picked him up in a Corvette and brought him into Utah
County to the site which had been arranged by the officers. (Hr.
pp. 63)
funds

Illsley indicated that the Appellant did not provide any

to purchase

chemicals, materials

involved in the activity.

or

any

other

expenses

The housing, chemicals, equipment, and

every other item necessary was purchased by the law enforcement
team. (Hr. pp. 85)
Illsley testified that the Appellant was to receive some share
from the sale of any drugs produced and the sum of $10,000.00 for
showing Illsley how to manufacture methamphetamine.

He was shown

$10,000.00 in cash after arriving at the site. (Hr. pp. 83-84)
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At the conclusion of the evidence presented by the State, the
court recessed the matter until March 8, 1993, at which time the
informant Argyle was to be present. (Hr. pp.105) At that time, the
State indicated that they had been unsuccessful in attempts to
locate Ross Argyle. Counsel for Appellant then moved in open court
to dismiss the Information due to the failure of the State to
produce the witness Argyle as ordered by the court. (Addendum,
Exhibit "E")
The test to be applied to determine whether a particular
defendant has been entrapped is an objective standard set forth in
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496. The objective test focuses not upon
the propensities and predisposition of a specific defendant to
commit the crime, but upon the police conduct involved in the case.
State v. Cripps, 692 P. 747 (Utah 1984); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d
315 (Ct. App. 1987) .

The Supreme Court has stated that "appeals

based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or
offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an
evaluation of the circumstances in each case, of what might
constitute prohibited police conduct." Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503.
Appellant submits that in the present case, the government
conduct fails the objective test.

The government was obviously

dealing with an individual who had no money, not even enough for
bus fare to come to the state of Utah. There was no indication as
set forth above, that the Appellant was a person on any list of
suspected drug dealers or a person whom posed any special threat.
The government in this case brought the Appellant into the state of
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Utah and into Utah County in particular when he had not the funds
or means to do so left to his own devices. The Appellant did not
contact the informant Argyle, Argyle contacted Appellant and
Argyle, acting for the government, urged Appellant to come into
Utah to be involved in criminal conduct. Appellant still could not
come to Utah since he had no transportation.
Appellant

without

the

assistance

resources to commit the crime.

of the

Neither Argyle nor
government

had

the

The government did offer an

"inordinate" sum of money from the standpoint of the Appellant in
offering $10,000.00 for merely showing the agent how to manufacture
methamphetamine

and the prospect of even greater amounts in

proceeds from the illegal conduct.

The fact that the government

agents felt it necessary to show the Appellant $10,000.00 in cash
prior to his performing any part of the process demonstrates the
intent of the government to use the lure of large amounts of cash
to induce the Appellant to proceed with the illegal activities.
The conduct on the part of the government in this case constituted
entrapment as a matter of law and the trial court should have
dismissed the Information on that ground.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that for all or any of the foregoing
reasons, his conviction should be reversed, or in the alternative,
the matter should be remanded for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of December, 1994.

MICHAEL D. E£PLIN (
'
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 21st day
of December, 1994, four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the following:
Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM
Statutes
21 U.S.C. §841(a)(l) and §846
U.S. Constitution,
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37c-4
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-403
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-404
Utah Code Annotated, §77-21-3
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(f)
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12
Exhibits
Exhibit "A" - U.S. District Court Warrant for Arrest
Exhibit "B" - Order entered by U.S. District Court
Exhibit

,!

C" - Ruling of Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth District
Court In and For Utah County

Exhibit "D" - Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-of-State Witness
Exhibit "Elf - Order to Produce Witness
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21 USCS § 841

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

the 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted
Nov. 10, 1978] may submit such report any time up to 97 days after
such date of enactment.
"(3) Until otherwise provided by the Attorney General by regulation, the information required to be reported by a person under
section 310(a)(1) of the Controlled Substances Act (as added by
section 202(a)(2) of this title) subsec. (a)(1) of this section with
respect to the person's distribution, sale, or importation of piperidine
shall—
"(A) be the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of such section, and
"(B) except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, be
reported not later than seven days after the date of such distribution, sale, or importation.".
Regulations for piperidine reporting. Act Nov. 10, 1978, P. L. 95-633,
Title II, § 203(b), 92 Stat. 3777, required the Attorney General to
publish proposed interim regulations for piperidine reporting under
subsec. (a) of this section not later than 30 days after enactment on
Nov. 10, 1978, and final interim regulations not later than 75 days after
enactment on Nov. 10, 1978, such final interim regulations to be
effective on and after the 91st day after such enactment.
Report to President and Congress on effectiveness of 21 USCS §§ 801
et seq. Act Nov. 10, 1978, P. L. 95-633, Title II, § 203(c), 92 Stat.
3777, required the Attorney General to analyze and evaluate the
impact and effectiveness of the amendments made by 21 USCS §§801
et seq. and report to the President and Congress not later than Mar. 1,
1980.
Repeal of this section. Act Sept. 26, 1980, P. L. 96-359, § 8(b), 94 Stat.
1194, deleted § 203(d) of Act Nov. 10, 1978, P. L. 95-633, 92 Stat.
3777, which would have repealed this section, effective Jan. 1, 1981.
OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
§ 841.

Prohibited acts A

(a) Unlawful acts. Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally—
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute
or dispense, a counterfeit substance.
(b) Penalties. Except as otherwise provided in section 405 [21 USCS
§ 845], any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be
sentenced as follows:
(1)(A) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II which is
a narcotic drug, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years, a fine of not more than $25,000, or
161

21 USCS § 846

D R U G ABUSE PREVENTION

Forms:
15 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Statutes of Limitation, and Other
Time Limits § 61:32.
Texts:
Bailey and Rothblatt, Handling Narcotic and Drug Cases.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Age of distributee must be alleged in indictment before enhanced sentence under 21 USCS
§ 845(a) may be imposed. United States v Moore
(1976) 176 App DC 309, 540 F2d 1088, later
app 183 App DC 461, 564 F2d 482.
In imposing sentence for violation of 21 USCS
§ 841(a), judge is entitled to take into account
juvenile nature of victims, and hence seriousness

§ 846.

of crimes, in deciding at what point to fix
sentence under § 841(b), and whether to make
some of sentences consecutive, even though
judge was not entitled to have recourse to provisions of 21 USCS § 845(a) because sales to
minors had not been specifically charged and
proved. United States v Moore (1977) 183 App
DC 461, 564 F2d 482.

Attempt and conspiracy

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any oflfense defined in
this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
(Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part D, § 406, 84 Stat. 1265.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Oct. 27, 1970,
P. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, which appears generally as 21 USCS
§§801 et seq. For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables
volumes.
Effective date of section:
Act Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part G, § 704(a), 84 Stat.
1284, which appears as 21 USCS § 801 note, provided that this section
is effective on the first day of the seventh calendar month that begins
after the day immediately preceding enactment on Oct. 27, 1970.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Am JUT:
16 Am Jur 2d, Conspiracy §§30, 31.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 167, 266, 363.
25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons § 37.
Am Jur Trials:
Handling the Defense in a Conspiracy Prosecution, 20 Am Jur Trials,
p. 356.
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
CHARLES COTESWORTH
PlNCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

Georgia

WILLIAM F E W ,
ABR BALDWIN.

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The Slates of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved.
That, the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and. that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON. Presidt. \V. JACKSON. Secretary

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X (BILL OF RIGHTS!
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
1 Religious a n d political freedoni.l
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
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A M E N D M E N T II
( R i g h t to b e a r a r m s . ]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
A M E N D M E N T III
( Q u a r t e r i n g soldiers.}
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
A M E N D M E N T IV
1 U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d seizures.!
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
(Criminal a c t i o n s — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g —
D u e p r o c e s s of l a w a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
A M E N D M E N T VI
( R i g h t s of a c c u s e d . ]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
A M E N D M E N T VII
(Trial by j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
A M E N D M E N T VIII
IBail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

58-37c-4

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(e) making any false statement in any application for license, in any record to be kept,
or on any report submitted as required under
this chapter;
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion
of the recordkeeping or reporting requirements of this chapter and rules related to
this chapter, receiving or distributing any
listed controlled substance precursor chemical in any manner designed so that the making of records or filing of reports required
under this chapter is not required;
(g) failing to take immediate steps to comply with licensure, reporting, or recordkeeping requirements of this chapter because of
lack of knowledge of those requirements,
upon becoming informed of the requirements;
(h) presenting false or fraudulent identification where or when receiving or purchasing a listed controlled substance precursor
chemical;
(i) creating a chemical mixture for the
purpose of evading any licensure, reporting
or recordkeeping requirement of this chapter
or rules related to this chapter, or receiving
a chemical mixture created for that purpose;
(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age,
employing, hiring, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing another person under 18 years of age to violate any provision of
this chapter, or assisting in avoiding detection or apprehension for any violation of this
chapter by any federal, state, or local law
enforcement official; and
(k) obtaining or attempting to obtain or to
possess any controlled substance precursor
or any combination of controlled substance
precursors knowing or having a reasonable
cause to believe that the controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the
unlawful manufacture of any controlled substance.
(11) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in
Section 58-1-102 and as may be further defined
by rule includes the following:
(a) violation of any provision of this chapter, the Controlled Substance Act of this
state or any other state, or the Federal Controlled Substance Act; and
(b) refusing to allow agents or representatives of the division or authorized law enforcement personnel to inspect inventories or
controlled substance precursors or records or
reports relating to purchases and sales or
distribution of controlled substance precursors as such records and reports are required
under this chapter.
\9*x\
5S-37C-4. B o a r d .
(1) There is hereby established a Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory Board which shall consist
of four individuals representing distributors and purchasers of controlled substance precursors and one
member from the general public.
(2) The board shall be appointed and serve in accordance with Section 58-1-201.
(3) The duties and responsibilities of the board
shall be in accordance with Sections 5S-1-202 and
fi«-1.9fV«

|<K);j
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5S-37c-5.

R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of D e p a r t m e n t of Com
m e r c e — D e l e g a t i o n to the Division oi
O c c u p a t i o n a l a n d Professional Licensing — R u l e m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y of t h e division.
(1) Responsibility for the enforcement of the licensing and reporting provisions of this chapter shall be
with the Department of Commerce.
(2) The executive director shall delegate specific
responsibility within the department to the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
i.-J» The division shall make, adopt, amend, and repeal rules necessary for the proper administration
and enforcement of this chapter.
1992
58-37c-G. Division d u t i e s .
The division shall be responsible for the licensing
and reporting provisions of this chapter and those
duties shall include:
(1) providing for a system of licensure of regulated distributors and regulated purchasers;
(2) refusing to renew a license or revoking,
suspending, restricting, placing on probation, issuing a private or public letter of censure or reprimand, or imposing other appropriate action
against a license;
(3) with respect to the licensure and reporting
provisions of this chapter, investigating or causing to be investigated any violation of this chapter by any person and to cause, when necessary,
appropriate administrative action with respect to
the license of t h a t person;
(A) presenting evidence obtained from investigations conducted by appropriate county attorneys and the Office of the Attorney General for
civil or criminal prosecution or for administrative action against a licensee;
(5) conducting hearings for the purpose of revoking, suspending, placing on probation, or imposing other appropriate administrative action
against the license of regulated distributors or
regulated purchasers in accordance with the provisions of Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, and Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act;
(6) assisting all other law enforcement agencies of the state in enforcing all laws regarding
controlled substance precursors;
(7) specifying reports, frequency of reports,
and conditions under which reports are to be submitted and to whom reports are to be submitted
by regulated distributors and regulated purchasers with respect to transactions involving
threshold amounts of controlled substance precursors; and
(8) performing all other functions necessary to
fulfill division duties and responsibilities as outlined under this chapter or rules adopted pursuant to this chapter.
1992
58-37e-7. L i c e n s e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .
(1) The division shall issue to persons qualified under the provisions of this chapter and rules adopted a
license in the classifications:
(a) controlled substance precursor distributor;
or
(b) controlled substance precursor purchaser.
(2) It is unlawful for a person to engage in the distribution, sale, transfer, or in the purchase or obtaining of a controlled substance precursor in a regulated
transaction without being licensed or excepted from
licensure under this chapter.
1992
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and labeled in compliance with the requirements of $ 305 of the Federal Comprehensive Drug
-\buse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose
of filling a prescription shall alter, deface, or remove
any label affixed by the manufacturer.
(3) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any
controlled substance on a prescription issued by a
practitioner, he shall affix to the container in which
the substance is sold or dispensed a label showing his
own name, address, and registry number, or the
name, address, :u\d registry number of the pharmacist or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully acting: the prescription number, the name of the patient,
or if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner
of the animal and the species of the animal; the name
of the practitioner by whom the prescription was
written; any directions stated on the prescription and
anv directions required by rules and regulations promulgated by the department.
No person shall alter the face or remove any label
so long as any of the original contents remain.
(4) An individual to whom or for whose use any
controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner and the owner of any animal
for which any substance has been prescribed, sold, or
dispensed by a veterinarian may lawfully possess it
only in the container in which it was delivered to him
by the person selling or dispensing it.
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58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except, as authorized by this chapter, it is
unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or
to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the
course of his business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a
licensed practitioner; or
(i v) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lKa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or
II is guilty of a second degree felony and
upon a second or subsequent conviction of
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection
is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is u n lawful-

58-37-8

(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized
by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the use or possession
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed
from those present; however, a person may
not be convicted under this subsection if the
evidence shows that he did not use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior
unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
liv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled
substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in Section 78-14-5
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in
Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any
physical condition requiring the administration of a controlled substance for immediate
relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled
substance in excess of medically recognized
quantities necessary to treat the ailment,
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to
another person knowing that the other person is using a false name, address, or other
personal information for the purpose of securing the same,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2Ka)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule 1 or
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty
of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in
the form of an extracted resin from any part
of the plant, and the amount is more than
one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.
(C) A n v

no-
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viction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of
t h a t included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment
of conviction entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant.
1974
76-1-403.

F o r m e r prosecution barring subseq u e n t p r o s e c u t i o n for offense o u t of
same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode,
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution:
and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted
in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a
determination t h a t there was insufficient evidence to
w a r r a n t conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense
even though the conviction for the lesser included
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted
in a j u d g m e n t of guilt that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by
the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place before the verdict,
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and
takes place after a jury has been impanelled and
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination;
or
(bl T h e defendant waives his ri^ht to object to
the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record
t h a t the termination is necessary because.
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict
reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial
without injustice to the defendant or the
state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a
verdict; or
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(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.
1974
76-1-404.

Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n b a r r i n g prose c u t i o n in s t a t e .
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission
of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal
or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are
defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses.
1973
76-1-405.

S u b s e q u e n t p r o s e c u t i o n not b a r r e d —
Circumstances.
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not
be barred under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by
the defendant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to avoid the sentence that
might otherwise be imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or
similar collateral attack.
1973
PART 5
BURDEN OF P R O O F
76-1-501.

P r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e — "Elem e n t of t h e o f f e n s e " defined.
(Ii A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, a t t e n d a n t circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
<b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not
elements of the offense but shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1973
76-1-502.

N e g a t i n g d e f e n s e by allegation or
proof — When not required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
ment, or other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a
result of evidence presented at trial, either
by the prosecution or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense,
and the defendant has presented evidence of
such affirmative defense.
1973
76-1-503. P r e s u m p t i o n of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this
code or other penal statute h a s the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the
presumption exist, the issue of the existence of
the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury
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Procedure to secure attendance of witness from without state.
Fees.
Witnesses not subject to arrest or service
of process.

77-21-1. S h o r t title — C o n s t r u c t i o n .
This chapter may be cited as the "Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings." It shall be interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which
enact it.
i*so
77-21-2.

P r o c e d u r e to s e c u r e a t t e n d a n c e in a n other state.
If a judge of a court of record in any state, which by
its laws has made provisions for commanding persons
within that state to attend and testify in this state,
certifies under the seal of the court that there is a
criminal prosecution pending in the court, or thai a
grand jury investigation has commenced or is about
to commence, t h a t a person being within this state is
a material witness in the prosecution or grand jury
investigation and that his presence will be required
for a specified number of days, upon presentation of
the certificate to any judge of a court of record within
this state in the county in which the person is found,
the judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing and
make an order directing the witness to appear at a
time and place certain for the hearing.
If at a hearing the judge determines that the witness is material and necessary, that it will not cause
undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to attend and testify in the prosecution or grand jury investigation in the other state, and that the laws of the
state in which the prosecution is pending, or grand
jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence, and of any other state through which the witness may be required to pass by ordinary course of
travel, will give him protection from arrest and the
service of civil and criminal process, he shall issue a
summons, with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the court
where the prosecution is pending, or where a grand
jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence at a time and place specified in the summons.
In any such hearing the certificate shall be prima
facie evidence of all the facts stated therein.
If the certificate recommends that the witness be
taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state to assure his attendance
in the requesting state, the judge may. in lieu of notification of the hearing, direct the witness to be immediately brought before him for the hearing, and the
judge at the hearing being satisfied of the desirability
of custody and delivery, for which determination the
certificate shall be prima facie proof of desirability,
may, in lieu of issuing subpoena or summons, order
the witness to be immediately taken into custody and
delivered to an officer of the requesting state.
If the witness who is summoned as above provided,
after being paid or tendered by some properly authorized person the sum of 20 cents a mile for each mile
by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court
where the prosecution is pending and $30 for each
day he is required to travel and attend as a witness,
fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he shall be punished in the
manner provided for the punishment of an>' witness

77-21-5

who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record
in this state.
i9s<i
77-21-3.

P r o c e d u r e to s e c u r e a t t e n d a n c e of witness from w i t h o u t state.
If a person in any state, which by its laws has made
provision for commanding persons within its borders
to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions, or
grand jury investigations commenced or about to
commence, in this state, is a material witness in a
prosecution pending in a court of record in this state,
or in a grand jury investigation which has commenced or is about to commence, a judge of the court
may issue a certificate under the seal of the court
stating these facts and specifying the number of days
the witness will be required. The certificate may include a recommendation that the witness be taken
into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of
this state to assure his attendance in this state. This
certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of
record in the county in which the witness is found
If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in
this state he shall be tendered such sum as may be
required by the laws of the state in which the witness
is found, not exceeding the sum of 20 cents a mile for
each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from
the court where the prosecution is pending and $30
for each day that he is required to travel and attend
as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the summons shall not
be required to remain within this state a longer period of time than the period mentioned in the certificate unless otherwise ordered by the court. If the witness, after coming into this state, fails without good
cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he shall be punished in the manner provided
for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a
summons issued from a court of record in this state.
198<)

77-21-4. F e e s .
W h e n e v e r a j u d g e of a c o u r t of record o( t h i s s t a t e
i s s u e s a c e r t i f i c a t e u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r to o b t a i n t h e a t t e n d a n c e of a w i t n e s s for t h e prosec u t i o n from w i t h o u t t h e s t a t e in a c r i m i n a l prosecution or g r a n d j u r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o m m e n c e d or a b o u t
to c o m m e n c e h e s h a l l d e s i g n a t e t h e r e i n a s u i t a b l e
p e a c e officer of t h i s s t a t e to p r e s e n t t h e certificate to
t h e p r o p e r officer or t r i b u n a l of t h e s l a t e w h e r e i n t h e
w i t n e s s is found a n d to t e n d e r to t h e w i t n e s s h i s p e r
t h e m a n d m i l e a g e fees.
T h e officer s h a l l e x h i b i t t h e certificate to t h e
c o u n t y a u d i t o r of t h e c o u n t y in w h i c h t h e c r i m i n a l
p r o c e e d i n g is p e n d i n g a n d t h e a u d i t o r shall d r a w h i s
w a r r a n t u p o n t h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r in favor of t h e
officer in t h e a m o u n t to be t e n d e r e d t h e w i t n e s s . T h e
officer s h a l l be l i a b l e u p o n h i s official bond for t h e
p r o p e r d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e m o n e y received
In all c a s e s in w h i c h t h e officer is r e q u i r e d to t r a v e l
in o r d e r to p r e s e n t t h e c e r t i f i c a t e a n d t e n d e r fees, h i s
a c t u a l a n d n e c e s s a r y t r a v e l i n g e x p e n s e s shall be paid
o u t of t h e fund from w h i c h w i t n e s s e s for t h e prosecution in t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g a r e paid
IHHO

77-21-5.

Witnesses not s u b j e c t to arrest o r service of p r o c e s s .
If a person comes into this state in obedience to a
summons directing him to attend and testify in this
state he shall not, while in this state pursuant to such
summons, be subject to arrest or the sen-ice of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters
which arose before his entrance into this state under
the summons.
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tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence o r
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
ofilce of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of i
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court.
WKH
78-2a-3. C o u r t of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process n ecessa rv:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission. State Tax
Commission, Hoard of Stale Lands. Board of Oil.
Gas. and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
Oil a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-4 6a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
te) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(0 appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
ig) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs >ought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the

228

Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b. Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
1994
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
19^
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of C o u r t of A p p e a l s .
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
1986

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when circuit and district court
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78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-.M1.5
State District Court Administrative
System.
78-3-12.
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78-3-13.
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Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and
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78-3-17.5.
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78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
78-3-19.
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78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
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78-3-21.5.
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78-3-23.
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78-3-24.
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Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by statute as one for which bail may be
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support
the charge and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would constitute a substantial danger to any other person or
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law.
MSS (2nd s.s.i
Sec. 9.

[ E x c e s s i v e bail and fines — Cruel p u n ishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. IH«M;
Sec. 10. (Trial by jury.J
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
IKIK;
Sec. II. [Courts open — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.
IH;K;
Sec. 12. (Rights of a c c u s e d persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopard v for the same offense.
1896

( R i g h t s of a c c u s e d persons.] ( P r o posed.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
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dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing
in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at an>' preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or
rule.

|1994|

Sec. 13. (Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.J
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
Sec. 14.

(Unreasonable s e a r c h e s forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.1
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
1896
Sec. 15.

J F r e e d o m of s p e e c h and of the p r e s s —
Libel. 1
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16.

(No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
1896
S e c . 17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 1896
S e c . 18.

(Attainder — Ex p o s t facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

EXHIBIT "A"
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DIVISION

^ t s t r t c t (Enuri
UTAH

DISTRICT OF.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

WARRANT FOR ARREST

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS
CASE NUMBER

: ^,-^\-^V^-V\

To: The United States Marshal
and any Authorized United States Officer

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to ^^rest

and bring him or her forthwith to the nearest magistrate to answer a(n)

HJ Indictment

C Information XjX] Complaint

charging him o* her with

(bfief desC r.ot.on

•

Order of court

D Violation Notice

C Probation Violation Petition

of offense*

ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE
METHAMPHETAMINE
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in violation o f j i t l e .

n

RON.\LD N . BOYCE
Name of !6«uing Officer

Signature of Issuing Officer

Sail fixed at $.

United States Code, Section(s).
United

/

'

841(a)(1)

and 846

States Magistrate Judge

Title of Issuing Officer

August 8,
Date and Location

f

1991, Salt

Lake

by.
Name of Judicial Officer

RETURN
This warrant was received and executed with the arrest of the above-named defendant at.

City,

Utah
~~
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DAVID J. JORDAN, United States Attorney (#1751)
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN, Assistant United States Attorney,
(/:
c
A t t o r n e y s for t h e United States of America
c/; -j '
476 United States Courthouse
350 South M a i n Street
Salt L a k e City, Utah 84101
,.
~<^
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 524-5682
'1A,-:r. /
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IN T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

•• c,

CENTRAL DIVISION, DISTRICT OF UTAH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

91-CR-193G

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS,
Defendant.

On August 25, 1992, a f t e r reviewing b r i e f s and h e a r i n g
argument on t h i s matter, the court hereby d i s m i s s e s t h e
i n d i c t m e n t a g a i n s t t h e defendant with p r e j u d i c e pursuant t o 18
U.S.C. §3162.

DATED t h i s

2±

Copies mailed 9/4/92ch:
David J . Schwendiman, AUSA
Manny Garcia, Esq.

USMS
Probation

day of

1992.

BY T H E COURT:

hr^i
MAS G R E E N E ,

i^a^

Judge
States D i s t r i c t Court

EXHIBIT »C"

RECEIVED >:AR - ^ 1993

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING
Case No. 921400455

Plaintiff,
v.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, JR.,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Entrapment. A hearing was held on November 16, 1992 concerning the pending motions.
Additional memoranda were filed and on December 10, 1992, the Motion to Dismiss was
submitted for decision. On that same day a hearing was held concerning defendant's Motion
for Entrapment. Testimony was taken and evidence was received. The hearing was
continued until March 8, 1993 to take additional testimony and to entertain closing
arguments. The Court, having heard the evidence and witnesses in support of their
respective positions, having carefully reviewed the file, and being fully advised in the
premises, now enters the following:
RULING
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was arrested on August 7, 1991 and indicted by a federal grand jury on

August 15, 1991 on one count of Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine. This arrest
was the result of a drug task force effort involving the D.E.A. and local law enforcement
officers. No other charges were brought in U.S. District Court, for the District of Utah.
Prior to trial, the federal charges were eventually dismissed based upon a violation the
Federal Speedy Trial Act and an order granting the dismissal was filed on September 2,
1992.
On August 25, 1992, defendant was arrested on the State charges pending in this
case. Counsel was appointed for defendant. The Preliminary Hearing was conducted on
September 8, 1992, and defendant was bound over to this Court. On September 29, 1992,
defendant was arraigned and asserted his right to a speed} trial. The Court accordingly set
trial within thirty days to begin on October 13, 1992.
Defendant filed a number of pro se motions between September 25, 1992 and
December 8, 1992. On October 5, 1992, counsel for defendant filed a Motion for
Entrapment and accompanying memorandum. On October 9, 1992, the Court held a
conference call. The topic of the call was to discuss the original trial date in light of the
defendant's Entrapment motion and to explore possible conflicts of interest. The Court then
struck the October 13, 1992 trial date and set the matter for hearing on October 13, 1992.
On October 13, 1992, the trial date was set for December 10, 1992. Defense counsel was to
file any additional motions by October 19, 1992 and a hearing on all pending motions was
set for October 28, 1992.
2

On October 28, 1992, this matter came before the Court on the pending motions.
Defense counsel indicated that he intended to file additional motions and had not yet done so.
This Court then extended the time for defense counsel to file additional motions until October
30, 1992. At the October 28, 1992 hearing, defendant refused to waive any constitutional
rights which might be affected by the Court's action. On November 13, 1992, three days
before the scheduled hearing, defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss based on four
issues: (1) double jeopardy; (2) subsequent prosecution for the same criminal episode; (3)
concurrent jurisdiction; and (4) violation of right to a speedy trial. Shortly after this motion
was filed, defendant retained Michael Esplin, Esq. to represent him in this case. Defendant's
new counsel requested more time to prepare for trial and time to supplement the motion to
dismiss and motion for entrapment made by the public defender's office. The Court then
struck the second trial date and set the Entrapment motion for hearing on December 10,
1992.
On December 10, 1992, defendant's entrapment hearing came before this Court. The
State proceeded with its case. The hearing was continued based on a request by defense
counsel that the State produce Ross Argyle, the state's informant, as a witness. The State
agreed to attempt to locate Mr. Argyle and bring him to testify. The Court then continued
the entrapment hearing until March 8, 1993. The trial was set for March 9, 1993. The
Court took the other motions under advisement.
On March 8, 1993, further proceedings were held regarding the entrapment defense.
3

The State was not able to produce Mr. Argyle. (See infra p. 14). The State presented
additional evidence and rested. The defendant did not put on any witnesses and the
defendant did not testify. The Court took the entrapment motion under advisement and
struck the March 9, 1993 trial date.
IL
MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant has raised four issues in his Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, in his
supplemental memorandum, defendant argues that his due process rights have been violated.
This Court will treat each issue separately.
A.

Double Jeopardy.

Defendant argues that the state prosecution violates his right not be twice placed in
jeopardy. This constitutional guarantee is found in the fifth amendment to the United States
constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant argues that he was first
placed in jeopardy in the federal prosecution. "Jeopardy attaches when an accused in put on
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid indictment (or information), and a jury
has been sworn and impaneled." State v.Pearson. 818 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1991); Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). As the State points out in its opposition memorandum, the
defendant was not placed in jeopardy during his federal prosecution because the case was
dismissed prior to trial. The dismissal in the federal court "with prejudice" is not
synonymous with the attachment of double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Court denies
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defendant's claim of a violation of his double jeopardy right.
R,

Section 76-1-403 and Single Criminal Episode.

Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by the Utah Single Criminal
Episode statute. U.C.A. §76-1-403 states in pertinent part:
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal
episode is barred if:
(a)
The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402 (2) in the former prosecution; and
(b)
The former prosecution;
(iv)
was terminated by final order or judgment for the
defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and
that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact
that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.
Section 76-1-402 (2) provides:
Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single trial court: and
(b)
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(emphasis added).
The defendant presupposes that a federal prosecution for offenses arising out of the
same criminal episode will trigger the protection of the above sections. But as the State has
noted, the above quoted statute requires that the prior and subsequent prosecution be within
the jurisdiction of a single trial court. The Court adopts the reasoning of the State's
5

memorandum and accordingly denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on section 76-1403.
C.

Prosecution in a Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by Utah Code Ann. section
76-1-404, which states:
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction,
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined
in Section 76-1-403 and (2) the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense
or offenses
Defendant argues that the federal dismissal "with prejudice" meets one of the four
requirements as stated in section 76-1-403 (acquittal, conviction, improperly terminated, or
terminated by a final order that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact
that must be proved in a subsequent prosecution). None of these requirements applies to the
current case. This Court denies defendant's motion based on U.C.A. section 76-1-404.
P.

Due Process and the Right to a Speedy Trial.

The defendant alleges a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Related to that
argument, he further alleges a violation of federal due process. This argument appears to be
a variation of defendant's double jeopardy argument. Defendant relies on State v. Shabata,
678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) and United States v. Belcher. 762 F.Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991).
In Shatbata, state prosecutors were charged with the knowledge of investigators based on the
6

rationale that prosecutors and law enforcement officers make up the prosecutorial team. In
Belcher, the former prosecution was brought in state court and subsequently in federal court
by a single prosecutor who had authority to prosecute in both jurisdictions.
The defendant reasons that since federal and state officers were involved in the
underlying investigation which was common to both the federal and state prosecutions, that
the subsequent state prosecution should therefore be bound by result in the federal
prosecution. At very least, defendant urges that the time he spent should be considered for
purposes of speedy trial purposes.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of subsequent prosecution by
different jurisdictions. State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987). In Franklin, the state
prosecution took place after the federal prosecution had concluded. In discussing the
rationale for allowing subsequent state prosecution the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We do not agree with the above-described approach because it relinquishes
unnecessarily the power of the state to try and punish those who break its
laws. Under the rule urged by defendant, the State of Utah would be
foreclosed from legitimate prosecutions by the errors, omissions, or
inadequacies of federal prosecutions and would be unable to try even a
defendant who had received a federal pardon or whose conviction was reversed
by a federal appellate court because of an error in the federal trial. See, e.g.,
State v. LeCoure. 158 Mont. 340, 491 P.2d 1228 (1971) (defendant acquitted
of federal charges based on assault of F.B.I, agent because federal prosecutor
did not prove agent was acting within his official capacity at time of assault
and double jeopardy barred state law assault charges). We note also that the
approach urged by defendant, under which the federal prosecution would be
treated as if it were a Utah proceeding, would allow the federal government to
destroy Utah's right to try defendant merely by bringing defendant to trial for
some minor lesser included offense. See Brown v. Ohio. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
7

Defendant asks us to contrast the benefits to the state from the
dual-sovereignty doctrine, which he deems slight, with the unfairness to the
individual that may result from two trials. The protection against multiple
trials perceived by defendant is largely illusory. Were we to hold that Utah
could not try individuals because they had been previously tried in a federal
court, we still could not prevent the federal government from trying
individuals after they had been tried by Utah; we would thus be surrendering
state sovereignty in exchange for a more theoretical than real gain in individual
rights.
Franklin, at 38. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that the time a
defendant spends in federal custody cannot be counted against the state for speedy trial
purposes. State v. Trafnv. 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990).
Accordingly, this Court rejects defendants reasoning and determines that defendant's
due process rights are not violated by the subsequent state prosecution. Specifically, this
Court will not hold the state prosecution responsible for procedural errors in federal court.
The Court also finds that defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Defendant
waived his right to a speedy trial at the December 10, 1992 hearing. The delays prior to the
December 10, 1992 trial date occurred as a result of defendants pro se motions and defense
counsel's motions discussed above. The state has been ready to proceed at every stage of
this case and has not caused the delays. This Court denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss
based on an alleged violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial.
II.
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Defendant also argues that the charges should be dismissed due to entrapment by the
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law enforcement officers. Defendant alleges in his Memorandum in Support that Ross
Argyle, acting as a government agent, improperly enticed defendant while both were
incarcerated in Oregon. (See Defendant's Memorandum in Support re: Entrapment, p.2)
Section 76-2-303 states the standard governing entrapment determinations.
76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an
opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
Once an entrapment defense has been asserted, it is the burden of the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped. State v. Wilson, 565
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). The entrapment defense can be seen as an attack on the state's burden
to prove that defendant acted voluntarily. State v. Curtis. 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975).
The statute cited above incorporates an objective standard. "[T]he focus is not on the
propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct
revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for
the proper use of government power; the subjective test is specifically rejected." State v.
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). The standard for finding that entrapment has occurred is
a factual finding that the conduct of the law enforcement officers or their undercover partners
create^ a substantial risk that the offense could be committed by one not otherwise ready to
9

commit it. The statute prohibits active inducement, luring an average person into the
commission of an offense.
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed a trial court's denial of an entrapment
motion. State v. Gallegos. 207 Utah Adv. 53 (Utah App. 1993). In Galleeos, the police
employed a convicted felon as a confidential informant. In upholding the trial court's
decision the court of appeals stated: "At no time in any of the transactions did Bennett
employ inducements that would have been, as a matter of law, sufficient to induce an
ordinary person to commit the crimes for which defendant was convicted." Id. at 55.
Therefore, agents of law enforcement officers are treated under the objective standard as
well.
The Court has reviewed the transcripts of telephone calls placed to the defendant
between the dates of August 2, and August 7, 1991. Both parties have stipulated as to the
accuracy of the transcript and the Court admitted the transcript. Additionally, the Court
heard testimony from many of the officers involved in the investigation. After carefully
reviewing all the evidence presented, this Court determines that the State has proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that the law enforcement conduct did not create a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.

Also, in the present

case there is nothing in the recorded transcripts on conversations between the defendant and
Argyle that demonstrates an "inducement" offered by Argyle to defendant.
The facts supporting this determination are numerous. The transcript of the telephone
10

conversations between August 2, and August 7 are replete with statements by defendant
demonstrating his willingness and eagerness to set up a methamphetamine lab. For example,
conversation between the defendant and Ross Argyle made on August 2, 1991 at 10:20 a.m.
demonstrate this point. The defendant also fully understood the risk he was taking.1 Rather

1

On August 3, 1991, telephone call beginning at 8:55 p.m., page four, the defendant
and Charles Illsley had the following conversation:
Jim:

Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:

Yeah right. It, we, we, we can, we can make ten million dollars, you
know, a million, ten million. We can make fifty million, if everybody
has the balls to do it, but the
If I didn't have, if I didn't have the balls, I wouldn't have been running
around.
The larger you do it though, the more chance you take, you see what
I'm saying?
Yeah.
I'm only talking about a one shot deal and then laying low.

Later in the same conversation, page 6, the defendant demonstrates the risks to himself if
arrested:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:

I'm not trying to come off as a hard guy.
I mean, no, I hear you, you got to be careful.
I'm just trying to tell you what we can do and what we can't do.
You know, if you're not careful, you end up doing time, and I ain't
doing time.
Yeah, that's the whole thing.
Behind this.
Yeah, and ain't none of us going to do time because I'm, I'm, I'll go
down the hard way, you know, this time cause
Yeah.
You know, you know what, this time, this is my third time, I'll, I'll do
to much time, you know, a lot of time.
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than arm twist the defendant into coming to Utah, the officers involved merely provided the
defendant with an opportunity to set up the lab. The statements in the transcript and the
testimony of the officers are consistent. The defendant planned on coming to Utah, setting
up a Meth lab, selling the product, and dividing the proceeds between himself, Ross Argyle,
and an undercover DEA agent, Charles Illsley. The defendant specifically requested money
from agent Illsley and the Court specifically finds that the defendant's request for "tuition"
did not induce defendant to come to Utah and set up the lab. The ten thousand dollars was
the amount agent Illsley agreed to pay defendant for learning how to produce
methamphetamine.
The Court therefore determines that the State has met its burden of proving voluntary
action on the part of the defendant and the defendant's Motion for Entrapment is hereby
denied.

m.
ESSENTIAL WITNESS
Defendant made an oral motion at the March 8, 1993 hearing that defendant has been
denied due process because of the failure of the State to produce an essential witness. The
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and the sixth amendment of the United States
Constitution provide, among the rights afforded an accused, the right to compulsory process
for defense witnesses. The issue before this Court is, whether the unavailability of a
proposed defense witness violates due process of law.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "The purpose of due process is to prevent
fundamental unfairness, and one of its essential elements is the opportunity to defend." State
v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1991). Although this Court has been unable to locate any
authority directly addressing the occasion where a proposed witness is unavailable, this Court
believes that cases interpreting U.C.A. Section 77-21-3 are analogous. Section 77-21-3
provides for issuance of a certificate of attendance in criminal cases for material witnesses.
In State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the defendant challenged the trial court's
denial of issuing a certificate for attendance of a witness. The supreme court held that
H

[f]ailure to demonstrate materiality as required by statute is a basis for affirming the trial

court's ruling." The supreme court went on to state:
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees that '[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....' In Washington v. Texas. 388
U.S. 14 (1967), the United States Supreme Court found a violation of this
guarantee where the defendant had been arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony
[that] would have been relevant and material, and... vital to the defense.' Id.
at 16 (emphasis added). In United States v. Valenzuela-BernaL 458 U.S. 858
(1982), the Supreme Court reasoned that the language of the sixth amendment
and of Washington suggested that a criminal defendant, in order to establish a
violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process, must make some
plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness 'would have been
both material and favorable to his defense.' Id. at 873 (footnote omitted).
Testimony is material, and its exclusion is therefore prejudicial, if there is a
reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial.
'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, , 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2068 (1984).
'The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern
with the justice of the finding of guilt.... This means that the omission must be
13

evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt
about guilt whether or not the evidence is considered, there is no justification
for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable
validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt.'
Id. This Court will apply the above principles to the present case.
There is no dispute as to the State's willingness to produce Mr. Argyle. The
defendant requested that the State produce Argyle as a witness at the hearing and trial. The
State was not able to locate Argyle and Mr. Taylor proffered that the State had attempted to
locate Argyle at the address provided by defense counsel, attempted to locate him in Utah
and in Oregon, and that the State had placed an investigator on the problem without avail.
The Court determines that based on the above, Argyle is not an material witness and
therefore not essential in order to provide the defendant with due process of law. In support
of this determination the Court finds the following facts based on testimony presented at the
hearing: (1) Ross Argyle acted as a confidential informant during the investigation; (2) that
Argyle became an informant after his extradition to Utah on probation violation charges; (3)
that Argyle was provided renumeration for information; (4) all conversations between Argyle
and defendant made while Argyle was in Provo were tape recorded. There was no evidence
presented to the Court that Argyle was an agent for the DEA or other law enforcement
agency prior to his extradition to Utah. Only by making some kind of showing that Argyle
was an agent while incarcerated with the defendant could the defendant raise the materiality
of Argyle's actions during that period.
14

The Court hereby denies defendant's motion for dismissal based on violation of due
process of law.
Dated t h i s / i f d a y of March, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Jim Taylor
Michael Esplin
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EXHIBIT »D"

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
P.O. Box "L"
43 East 200 North
Provof Utah 84603
Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

VS.

MOTION TO SECURE ATTENDANCE OF
OUT OF STATE WITNESS

:

JAMES ARTHUR

BYRNS 3

:

Defendant.

Case No. 921400455 FS
(JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS)

:

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his attorney of
record,

Michael

D.

Esplin,

and

hereby

moves

this

Court

for

certificate pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 77-21-3 to
assure the presence of Ross Argyle, a resident of the State of
Oregon, at the hearing on defendant's Motion for Entrapment and at
the trial of this matter.

Defendant's request is made upon the

following grounds:
1.

The offense with which the defendant is charged is a

result of a law enforcement operation in which the defendant was
induced to come to the State of Utah by law enforcement officers or
1

persons acting as their agents.
2.

Defendant

has

filed

a

Motion

for

Determination

of

Entrapment Defense in this matter.
3.
made

The person who initiated contact with the defendant and

representations

to

defendant

which

defendant

alleges

to

constitute entrapment was Ross Argyle, the out of state witness
defendant seeks to have appear.
4.

Defendant has reason to-believe that Argyle was acting

with and on behalf of the law enforcement agencies which ultimately
charged defendant with the offenses presently before this court.
5.

Defendant's position is that Argyle improperly induced

defendant to engage in the conduct resulting in the present charges
upon which defendant is being prosecuted.
6.

Further, defendant believes that Argyle was promised

substantial consideration for inducing the defendant into illegal
conduct and that the reception of said consideration was dependant
upon

the

success

of

his

efforts

participation in illegal activities.

to

induce

defendant

into

This conduct resulted in

procedures on the part of the law enforcement agencies which are
contrary to public policy and which resulted in improper inducement
by Argyle of defendant.
7.

Without the witness Argyle, the defendant cannot fully
2

present his defense of entrapment in this matter•
WHEREFORE, defendant requests this court issue the appropriate
certificate to assure the witness's attendance at the hearing on
defendant's entrapment defense and at the trial of this matter.
DATED this

/

day of December, 1992.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

MICHAEL D. EBPLINAttorney for Defendant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the
foregoing instrument to Kay Bryson, Utah County Attorney, at 100
East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606 this 1st day of December,
1992.

EXHIBIT "E»

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 37 3-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER TO PRODUCE WITNESS
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 921400455

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, JR.,

(Judge Lynn W. Davis)

Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled
Court on the 10th day of December, 1992, the Honorable Lynn W.
Davis, District Court Judge, presiding-

The Plaintiff, STATE OF

UTAH, was represented by James Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney.
The Defendant was present in person and was represented by Michael
D. Esplin.

The Court and counsel discussed the matter of the

Defendant's motions concerning the witness, Ross Argyle.

Based

upon the Stipulation of the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
STATE OF UTAH produce Ross Argyle as a witness for the STATE and
that Mr. Argyle be present at the continuation of this matter on
March/ 8,

1993.

Defendant

is

to

cooperate

in

supplying

any

information to the STATE which would be helpful in ascertaining the

whereabouts of Mr. Argyle.
DATED this

day of January, 1993BY THE COURT:

LYNN W. DAVIS
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

JAMES TAYLOR
Deputy Utah County Attorney

